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Abstract
This study examined the relationship between test anxiety, depression, and four of Ellis’s
(1963) irrational beliefs (demand for approval, anxious overconcern, helplessness, and
frustration reactivity). Participants completed questionnaires examining test anxiety, depressive
symptoms, and irrational beliefs. It was expected that the first three beliefs would be predictive
of students’ test anxiety scores. Students with high test anxiety and high depressive symptoms
were also expected to score high on frustration reactivity, in contrast to low scores found among
high test-anxious, low-depressive students. Demand for approval and anxious overconcern were
found to be significant predictors of level of test anxiety. However, no significant differences
were found between the high-depression and low-depression groups for the belief of frustration
reactivity.
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Test Anxiety, Depression, and Irrational Beliefs in College Students
Psychological theories on the development of mood and anxiety disorders have
progressed over more than a century, beginning with Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, and moving
more recently towards behavioral and cognitive-behavioral models to explain these prevalent
disorders. Over 28% of U.S. citizens will experience a form of anxiety disorder during the
course of their lifetimes, and 16.6% will experience major depressive disorder (Kessler,
Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005). College students are at risk for a number
of mental disorders, including anxiety disorders, which are estimated to affect over 15% of
undergraduate students (Eisenberg, Gollust, Golberstein, & Hefner, 2007). In particular, test
anxiety is prevalent on college campuses (Spielberger et al., 1976); some studies show that as
much as 15-20% of college students struggle with test anxiety (Driscoll, Holt, & Hunter, 2005;
Zeidner, 1998). Another common disorder is that of depression; in 2006, 15% of college
students reported having been diagnosed with depression (American College Health Association,
2006). Several cognitive theories have been developed in order to explain the etiology and
maintenance of these disorders; these theories focus primarily on negative cognitions, worry, and
emotionality. In the growth of test anxiety as a construct, it is important to further explore the
relationship between test anxiety, depression, and these irrational beliefs.
General anxiety has been a topic of interest for centuries, pre-dating psychology as a
separate science and, some might argue, extending as far back as rational thought. The idea of
fear is often a theme found in ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs, and the medieval philosopher Ala
ibn Hazn made anxiety a central theme of many of his works (Spielberger, 1972). In more recent
years, anxiety has become a fundamental problem, and a major theme of research in the field of
psychology.
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One main distinction in the area of general anxiety that has been the topic of much
research is the concept of state versus trait anxiety. Trait-state anxiety theory was first posited in
1966 by Spielberger, who differentiated between anxiety as an emotion and anxiety as a
personality trait. State anxiety is one that is experienced in a situation subjectively perceived as
dangerous or risky, and is accompanied by autonomic nervous system activation, as well as
feelings of nervousness. Trait anxiety, on the other hand, would be found in a person who is
disposed to find a wide variety of situations to be anxiety-producing, to a greater extent than a
person without trait anxiety, who would only experience state anxiety (Spielberger, 1966).
Test anxiety
Test anxiety has long been considered a situation-specific facet of trait anxiety, beginning
with Spielberger, Anton, and Bedell (1976). They argued that, as a trait, test anxiety reflects
“individual differences in the tendency to perceive evaluative situations as threatening” (p. 323).
To further clarify, a person might experience state anxiety during a particularly difficult test;
however, a person with trait test anxiety would experience anxiety during all tests, independent
of the difficulty level, or his or her knowledge of the subject. Test anxiety, referred to in earlier
years as “examination stress” or “evaluation anxiety,” is a type of trait anxiety, which occurs in
situations involving performance evaluation. In research, the term “test anxiety” is not limited to
situations involving traditional forms of tests, such as paper examinations; it can refer to
situations where the evaluation is related to task performance, for example. Test anxiety can
even be limited to the type of test; for example, students with a specific type of test anxiety may
feel anxious only during math-related exams (math anxiety is often considered a separate
construct).
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Although some research was done on evaluation stress as early as 1914 (Zeidner, 1998),
test anxiety did not enter the field of psychology as a separate construct until the 1950s. At the
time, test anxiety was researched primarily in a behavioral context; researchers focused mainly
on relating anxiety, which they believed indicated drive and motivation, to performance and
learning (Mandler & Sarason, 1952). As well, the behavioral perspective brought about early
operational self-report measures of test anxiety, later expanding the construct to involve a
cognitive facet (Zeidner, 1998).
In the 1960s, Spielberger was a major test anxiety researcher, who first distinguished test
anxiety as a situation-specific type of trait anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1976). As well, two
components of test anxiety were determined: facilitating and debilitating anxiety. Facilitating
test anxiety leads to task-related responses and behaviors, whereas debilitating anxiety leads to
task-irrelevant behaviors (Alpert & Haber, 1960). There was a final conceptual development in
test anxiety research that brought about the distinction between worry and emotionality, as
researchers shifted towards cognitive orientations (Liebert & Morris, 1967). In this
development, worry was described as a cognitive component of test anxiety, involving
“cognitive concern about the consequences of failing” (p. 975), whereas emotionality was
designated as an affective component, reflecting the uncertainty of one’s success in a testing
situation (Liebert & Morris, 1967).
Beginning in 1970, research began to take on another topic: the influence of test anxiety
on academic performance. This movement was primarily begun by Wine (1971), whose
cognitive-attentional (or interference) model attempted to account for test anxiety’s impact on
performance (Zeidner, 1998). Wine (1971) built upon Alpert and Haber’s (1960) debilitating
versus facilitating anxiety and posited that a high test-anxious person would divide his or her
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time doing both task-related behaviors and task-irrelevant behaviors, including ruminating over
choices and worrying about his or her performance relative to others’, whereas a low testanxious participant would use only task-related behaviors (Wine, 1971). By the end of the
1970s, however, a second position emerged, and researchers began to investigate the concept of
study-skills deficits as related to test anxiety and performance, in contrast to a cognitivebehavioral etiology (Zeidner, 1998).
According to Zeidner (1998), who wrote a historical overview of the evolution of test
anxiety research, test anxiety research experienced a peak in research popularity in the 1980s,
and was conducted around the globe. Literature appeared in many of the most prestigious
psychological journals, and some of the first volumes on test anxiety began to be published.
During this time, test anxiety research focused mainly on testing theoretical models, such as selfcontrol and attributional self-expectancy, as information-processing models. As well, research
focused on treatment and alleviation of test anxiety (Zeidner, 1998).
Since its peak in the 1980s, research production on test anxiety has slowed somewhat,
focusing primarily on the development of new scales, new methods of analyzing data, and the
inclusion of cultural effects on test anxiety (Zeidner, 1998). However, test anxiety is still an
important research topic; it has been shown to affect a surprising number of college students.
Because of its prevalence, its development as a construct is still salient.
Irrational Beliefs and Test Anxiety
As researchers in the field of psychology shifted towards a more cognitive-based
viewpoint, Albert Ellis was a forerunner in advancing the cognitive perspective. In his
development of rational-emotive theory, Ellis (1963) built upon the task-related and taskirrelevant behaviors of Alpert and Haber (1960), and added the component of negative
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cognitions. He determined ten kinds of irrational beliefs that he found to be supportive of mood
and anxiety disorders, as well as other disorders. Briefly, those belief themes are: demand for
approval, high self expectations, blame proneness, frustration reactive, emotional
irresponsibility, anxious overconcern, problem avoidance, dependency, helplessness, and
perfectionism. These underlying beliefs can interact in any number of ways, and help influence
a person’s behavior and moods; ultimately, these beliefs and cognitions are a “prime cause of
neurosis” (p. 60). However, it is not simply a high level of irrational beliefs in general that can
contribute to a disorder or maladaptive thinking; it appears that different patterns of irrational
beliefs may be predictive of disordered symptoms (Deffenbacher, Zwemer, Whisman, Hill, &
Sloan, 1986). In fact, research has been conducted that connects patterns of irrational beliefs to
disorders such as depression, anxiety, PTSD, and even bulimia nervosa (Deffenbacher et
al.,1986; Demos, 2001; Muran, & Motta, 1993; Prud’homme & Barron, 1992).
It appears that the specific pattern of irrational belief themes may indicate what disorder a
person could experience. One such example is social anxiety disorder, which involves an
avoidance of social situations, and is characterized by a pervasive fear of negative social
evaluation (Watson & Friend, 1969). Social anxiety was significantly linked to the irrational
belief themes of personal perfection, helplessness, and dependency (Deffenbacher et al., 1986).
Both social and test anxieties are situation-specific forms of trait anxiety, in contrast to general or
trait anxiety which, according to Spielberger et al. (1976), refers to the tendency of a person to
evaluate a wide range of situations as dangerous and anxiety-producing. General anxiety was
significantly predicted by beliefs of anxious overconcern, personal perfection, catastrophizing,
and helplessness (Deffenbacher et al., 1986). As well, it was found that the irrational beliefs of
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participants with forms of test, speech, and social anxiety were positively correlated with degree
of symptoms (Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975).
Test anxiety has been linked to several irrational beliefs in particular. Deffenbacher et al.
(1986) found that test-anxious subjects significantly endorsed the irrational belief themes of
demand for approval, anxious overconcern, and helplessness, a finding that is similar to those of
other correlational studies using the Irrational Beliefs Test (Jones, 1968), an inventory based
directly upon Ellis’ 10 irrational belief themes (Ellis, 1963). The irrational belief of demand for
approval refers to the idea that one must be loved and approved of by everyone—an impossible
goal, where failure is inevitable (Ellis, 1963; Jones, 1968). When a person takes a high stake in
the irrational belief of anxious overconcern, he or she believes that if something dangerous or
unpleasant might occur, it is important to be very concerned about it, and to dwell on it in case it
does occur. In the irrational belief of helplessness, a person’s past is seen as a major determinant
in that person’s present and future behavior; it often involves a denial of responsibility, as one’s
behavior is dictated by the past. Someone who scores strongly on the helplessness subscale
would believe that it is impossible to change one’s ways (Ellis, 1963; Jones, 1968). In summary,
when these irrational beliefs are held in combination, a person’s cognitive schemas are related to,
or even predictive of, his or her test anxiety symptomology.
Irrational Beliefs and Depression
Irrational beliefs, however, are not limited in application to test anxiety alone; as
mentioned above, research has been conducted using irrational beliefs as a cognitive basis for
other disorders, such as depression. From the 1960s on, Aaron Beck was one of the forerunners
of the cognitive psychology movement as it affected research and treatment of depression. In his
early research, Beck found that many of his depressed patients showed evidence of negative
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cognitions; however, they did not seem to be aware of the negativity of their thoughts (Beck,
1991). Based on these negative cognitions, Beck formulated a theory of depression that argued
that the cognitions of depressed patients fall into three categories: negative perceptions and
expectations about themselves, the world, and the future (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).
He later found that these negative cognitions were not only present in depressed patients, but
were also common among patients with schizophrenia and anxiety disorders. Both Beck and
Ellis (1963) attempted to categorize the content of negative cognitions; in fact, Ellis’ and Beck’s
themes are rather similar.
Interestingly, the negative cognitions of depression and test anxiety have been found to
be similar in content, such as thoughts of helplessness (Swendsen, 1997). It would appear that
depression and test anxiety have some similar cognitive facets; in fact, the two appear to be
highly correlated in many populations (Burns & Eidelson, 1998; Rivas-Vazquez, Saffa-Biller,
Ruiz, Blais, & Rivas-Vazquez, 2004). Prud’homme and Barron (1992) found that subjects with
a diagnosis of major depressive disorder (MDD) held a pattern of beliefs similar to those in testanxious students: demand for approval, helplessness, and anxious overconcern. In addition,
however, MDD patients showed significant beliefs in the theme of frustration reactivity. The
belief of frustration reactivity is grounded in the idea that when things go wrong, or are not the
way one wishes them to be, it is awful and disastrous (Ellis, 1963; Jones, 1968); frustration
reactivity is sometimes referred to as “catastrophizing” (Deffenbacher et al., 1986).
The present study aims to examine patterns of irrational beliefs in one population of testanxious and depressive students, and to study how an individual high in both test anxiety and
depressive symptoms may differ in irrational beliefs from a subject high in test anxiety only.
First, this study focuses on irrational beliefs in test-anxious students, in particular the degree of
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irrational beliefs found across differential levels of test anxiety. I expect that the levels of
irrational beliefs held will be positively correlated with level of test anxiety. Specifically, the
irrational beliefs to be investigated will be anxious overconcern, helplessness, and demand for
approval. It is believed that these three irrational belief themes will be significant predictors of
test anxiety score; as a participant’s score on each of the irrational beliefs increases, so will his or
her score on the test anxiety inventory.
The second aim of this study is to examine patterns of irrational beliefs in students with
symptoms of both test anxiety and depression. I hypothesize that students who show high
amounts of test anxiety and depression will have a different pattern of irrational beliefs than
students with equal amounts of test anxiety, but with low or insignificant amounts of depressive
symptoms. Specifically, both groups will show belief in the irrational cognitions of anxious
overconcern, helplessness, and demand for approval. Additionally, however, high test-anxious,
high-depression students will also show beliefs in the category of frustration reactivity.
Method
Participants
A total of 135 students participated in this study. One hundred thirty-three male (n = 54)
and female (n = 89) participants were students enrolled in the General Psychology class, who
signed up for the study to fulfill part of a course requirement. One male student was recruited
after attending a school-sponsored study skills workshop. One female participant was an
undergraduate student from Germanna Community College, who, during a previous test anxiety
study, had indicated interest in participating in future test anxiety research. The mean age of
participants was 19.44 (SD = 2.87). The participants were relatively representative of the Mary
Washington student body, with 85.9% of students identifying themselves as Caucasian (n = 116).
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All participants completed an informed consent form and were debriefed after the study, in
accordance with American Psychological Association ethical guidelines.
Procedure
Due to time constraints, participants recruited after the study skills workshop were given
paper surveys; however, all other participants completed an identical online survey. Participants
who completed the survey as part of the General Psychology course requirements signed up
using the school’s online experiment sign-up page. Participants from Germanna Community
College were e-mailed using the contact information they had provided, and invited to take the
survey online as well. E-mail addresses were logged at the online survey site for General
Psychology students to ensure they received course credit, but participants’ names were not
connected to their data.
Participants completed self-report measures of test anxiety, depressive symptoms, and
irrational beliefs, and answered demographic questions (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics on
relevant scales).
Measures
Irrational Beliefs. To examine participants’ irrational beliefs, the Irrational Beliefs Test
(IBT; Jones, 1968) was used. The IBT is a 100-item self-report questionnaire that examines
Ellis’ 10 irrational belief themes. Briefly, those belief themes are demand for approval, high self
expectations, blame proneness, frustration reactive, emotional irresponsibility, anxious
overconcern, problem avoidance, dependency, helplessness, and perfectionism. The IBT asks
participants to rate how much they agree with statements such as “It is important to me that
others approve of me” on a scale of one to five, one being “strongly disagree,” and five being
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“strongly agree.” Each of the 100 items corresponds to one of the ten irrational belief themes;
participants receive a score on each theme subscale ranging from 10 (very low) to 50 (very high).
Test Anxiety. The Test Anxiety Scale (TAS), developed by Sarason (1978), is a 37-item
self-report measure used to examine levels of test anxiety. Each item is a statement that the
participant rates as true or false, such as “While taking an important examination I perspire a
great deal.” Scores range from 0 to 37. Participants with scores falling between 0 and 18 are
considered to be low test-anxious; scores from 19 to 37 indicate a high level of test anxiety. The
TAS is a commonly used inventory of test anxiety, with test-retest reliabilities in the .80s
(Sarason, 1980).
Depression. The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) was
developed by Radloff (1977) as a short, self-report inventory of depressive symptoms. The scale
consists of 20 statements, such as “I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me;”
participants rate each statement by indicating how many days, in the past week, they have felt
that way. For example, a rating of 0 indicates that the participant felt that way “rarely or some of
the time, less than 1 day;” a rating of 3, the highest, indicates the participant felt that way “all of
the time, 5-7 days.” A score between 0 and 15 indicates a low amount of depressive symptoms;
a score between 15 and 21 indicates a moderate amount, and a score above 21 suggests a
potential diagnosis of depressive disorder. It is important to note that the CES-D scale is
designed to be highly sensitive to depressive symptoms.
Results
An initial bivariate correlation was run to examine the intercorrelations between test
anxiety scores and all irrational belief subscales. Test anxiety score was found to be significantly
correlated (p < .01) with demand for approval, high self expectancy, frustration reactivity,
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emotional irresponsibility, anxious overconcern, problem avoidance, and helplessness. A
stepwise regression was then conducted to examine to what extent the irrational belief subscales
were significant predictors of test anxiety score. The first model included the variables from
hypothesis 1: demand for approval, anxious overconcern, and helplessness. The second model
included the other variables that were found to be significantly correlated with test anxiety scores
(see Table 2 for intercorrelational data). It was found that demand for approval and anxious
overconcern were significant predictors of test anxiety scores, p < .05, but that helplessness was
not a significant predictor, p = .068 (see Table 3 for regression data). The three subscales in
model 1 also explained a significant proportion of the variance in test anxiety scores, R2 = .26,
F(3, 114) = 12.21, p < .001. Only one of the variables in model 2 (which included all correlated
variables) was a significant predictor of test anxiety score: problem avoidance, p = .035.
However, model 2 explained only an additional 3.6% of the variance in test anxiety scores (R2 =
.30).
Second, an Independent Samples t-test was run to examine how high test-anxious, lowdepression participants differed in their irrational beliefs from high test-anxious, high-depression
participants (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations). Because of the highly sensitive
nature of the CES-D, and also because the range of “moderate” depression scores is so narrow,
all scores falling between 0 and 21 were considered indicative of low amounts of depressive
symptoms. Consistent with the original parameters of the scale, scores over 21 were considered
high. As expected, there were no significant differences for demand for approval, t(63) = -1.63,
p > .05; anxious overconcern, t(65) = -1.85, p > .05; or for helplessness, t(65) = -1.40, p > .05.
Contrary to the second hypothesis, however, there were also no significant differences for the
irrational belief of frustration reactivity, t(61) = -0.928, p > .05. Effect sizes for demand for
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approval and frustration reactivity were moderate (Cohen’s d = .55 and .59, respectively), while
effect sizes for anxious overconcern and helplessness were small (Cohen’s d = .18 for both). In
addition, a power analysis for the test, using the program G*Power, estimated power at .95.
Discussion
The first aim of this study was to examine patterns of irrational beliefs important to the
etiology of test anxiety. Based on the analysis, this hypothesis was partially supported: both
irrational belief themes of demand for approval and anxious overconcern were significant
predictors of scores on the TAS. However, it was found that the belief theme of helplessness
was not a significant predictor of test anxiety score; as well, the theme of problem avoidance was
found to be a significant predictor. This second finding is inconsistent with previous research
(Deffenbacher et al., 1986; Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975), which found that problem avoidance
was not significantly correlated with test anxiety.
The second hypothesis posited that students with high test anxiety and low depression
would differ from students with high test anxiety and high depression on the irrational belief
theme of frustration reactivity. Specifically, it was believed that depressive symptoms would be
highly correlated with frustration reactivity. However, the two groups were found to show
similar scores on all four subscales, and no significant differences were observed. Again, this
finding is inconsistent with previous studies (Deffenbacher et al., 1986; Prud’homme & Barron,
1992), which found that patients with test anxiety scored significantly higher on the IBT
subscales of demand for approval, helplessness, and anxious overconcern, whereas patients with
MDD additionally scored higher on the subscale of frustration reactivity.
These findings bring to light several important implications for future research on
irrational beliefs. First, that unaccounted-for comorbid disorders should be investigated when
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attempting to determine patterns of irrational beliefs. The current study did not take into account
students’ mental disorders other than depression and test anxiety; it is possible that the presence
of comorbid disorders could have affected the irrational belief subscale scores. In the study by
Deffenbacher et al., (1986), the irrational belief of problem avoidance was significantly endorsed
by participants with trait anxiety. It could be that general trait anxiety may be linked to test
anxiety; in future research, administration of a trait anxiety scale may help differentiate
participants who possess trait anxiety from those who are test anxious. The findings do suggest,
however, that demand for approval and anxious overconcern do play a role in the development
and maintenance of test anxious symptoms. These findings have implications for the cognitive
or cognitive-behavioral treatment of test anxiety, particularly in college populations.
This study, though imperfect, did yield several important results that should be taken into
account in future research, as well as treatment. First, test anxiety and irrational beliefs do
appear to be significantly correlated in a positive direction; as well, the experience of anxiety in
evaluative situations does seem to be linked to several specific irrational belief themes.
Therefore, in cognitive treatment, it may be beneficial to focus first on those irrational belief
themes. Second, these results highlight the importance of a comprehensive evaluation of
possible comorbid disorders; the presence of these disorders may affect not only the number and
content of irrational belief themes, but also the extent to which a person endorses them. This
research adds to the growing body of literature on the relationship between irrational beliefs and
psychological disorders, and provides additional evidence that the content of one’s irrational
beliefs may relate to or determine disordered symptomology.
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Table 1
Means (SD) for Test Anxiety, Depression, and Irrational Beliefs Test Subscales
Mean (SD)
N
Test anxiety

19.02 (8.01)
n = 125

Depression

17.98 (10.60)
n = 125

Demand for approval

28.43 (5.63)
n = 130

Anxious overconcern

32.65 (6.33)
n = 132

Helplessness

27.89 (5.77)
n = 133

Frustration reactivity

29.85 (5.30)
n = 131

Problem avoidance

31.23 (5.40)
n = 129
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Table 2
Intercorrelations Between Test Anxiety and Irrational Belief Test Subscales

Test anxiety
score
Demand for
approval
High self
expectancy
Blame
proneness
Frustration
reaction
Emotional
irresponsibility
Anxious
overconcern
Problem
avoidance
Dependency

Helplessness

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Demand
for
approval

High self
expectancy

Blame
proneness

Frustration
reaction

Emotional
irresponsibility

Anxious
overconcern

Problem
avoidance

Dependency

Helplessness

Perfectionism

.40**

.39**

-.02

.28**

.29**

.44**

.32**

.16

.35**

-.05

.43**

.03

.42**

.30**

.49**

.33**

.21*

.30**

-.07

.12

.41**

.17

.60**

.12

.16

.38**

.01

.17

.07

-.03

-.10

.10

.01

.05

.45**

.50**

.06

.17

.46**

-.04

.36**

.16

-.01

.47**

.30**

.21*

.27**

.36**

-.05

.00

.25**

-.18*

.05

.15
-.03
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Table 3
Summary of Stepwise Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting High Test Anxiety
(N = 118)
B

SE B

β

Demand for approval

.30

.14

.21*

Anxious overconcern

.34

.13

.26*

Helplessness

.24

.13

.19

Demand for approval

.21

.15

.14

Anxious overconcern

.24

.15

.19

Helplessness

.13

.15

.09

High self expectations

.13

.19

.08

Frustration reactivity

.07

.17

.04

Emotional irresponsibility

.07

.16

.04

Problem avoidance

.3

.14

.20*

Variable
Model 1

Model 2

*p < .05.

21

Test Anxiety
Table 4
Means (SD) for Depression and Irrational Beliefs Subscales
High Test Anxiety,
High Depression

High Test Anxiety,
Low Depression

Demand for approval

31.52 (5.57)
n = 31

29.29 (5.41)
n = 34

Anxious overconcern

35.79 (5.05)
n = 33

33.24 (6.19)
n = 34

Helplessness

30.03 (5.90)
n = 33

28.09 (5.45)
n = 34

Frustration reactance

31.73 (5.58)
n = 30

30.55 (4.57)
n = 33

Note. Scores are based on participants’ responses on IBT, with a minimum score of 10 and a
maximum score of 50.
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